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INTRODUCTION 
“Ferment  is  abroad  in  the  law.  The  sphere  of  interest  widens;  men  become 
interested again in the life that swirls around things legal. …  
Whether this ferment is one thing or twenty is a question; if one thing, it 
is twenty things in one. But it is with us. It spreads. It is no mere talk. It shows 
results, results enough through the past decade to demonstrate its value.” 
–  Karl N. Llewellyn
2  
 
This paper explores the contours of the relationship between the mind sciences 
and the Harvard Law School curriculum, in particular, and the law curriculum 
more generally. Rather than using a conceptual definition of “mind sciences”, 
the paper will be based on an illustrative and fairly loose definition thereof. Any 
discipline that delves into the mechanisms that explain the functioning of the 
human  mind  and  the  reasons  behind  human  behavior  is  considered  a  mind 
science for purposes of this study. Psychology, psychiatry, cognitive science, 
and neuroscience are examples of the disciplines that fit under the scope of this 
definition. Apart from this short introduction, the paper is divided into three 
more parts. 
Part I discusses the ideological sources of the relatively recent law and 
mind sciences movement at Harvard. Particular consideration will be given to 
the  role  played  by  the  legal  realists  in  questioning  assumptions  that  would 
otherwise prevent the mind sciences from permeating law and policy-making. 
Roscoe Pound was a figure of great importance to the mind sciences’ venture at 
Harvard by advocating a psycho-legal realism and by hiring Sheldon Glueck, a 
pioneer of empirical mind research along with his wife Eleanor, for the faculty. 
As it shall be seen, however, Pound did not remain a believer in the virtues of 
legal realism for long. 
Part  II  conducts  an  extensive  historical  review  of  the  law  and  mind 
sciences courses in the HLS curriculum from 1957 to 2013. Six trends, and a 
predicted future trend, were identified. A distinction that will be used throughout 
this paper, that between “perfect” law and mind sciences courses and “imperfect” 
law and mind sciences courses, will be explained. 
Part III is normative in its essence, making the case for the expansion of 
the  law  and  mind  sciences  curriculum.  This  argument  is  predicated  on  the 
answers  to  two  other  questions:  Who  should  decide  whether  this  expansion 
should be carried out? And, assuming its desirability, how should we go about 
it? The answers to these questions can be found in Part III. 
 
                                                        
2 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism – Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1222-23 (1931). MIND SCIENCES IN THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM  3 
I. HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND MIND SCIENCES AT 
HARVARD 
Legal realism, characterized by a belief in the indeterminancy of law, an anti-
formalistic understanding of legal reasoning, and a call for social empiricism,
3 
planted  the  theoretical  seed  that  decades  later  originated  the  law  and  mind 
sciences movement.
4 Like scholars of law and psychology presently, the legal 
realists were skeptical of many of the assumptions built into our laws and legal 
theories. Without the institution of this skepticism as a common element in legal 
discourse, a great part of the currently available law and mind scholarship would 
have  probably  never  seen  the  light  of  day.  If  contemporary  legal  scholars 
wouldn’t have been exposed to
5 and assimilated the realist idea that rules run out 
on legal decision-makers – i.e., that there is often leeway for multiple readings 
of the same rule and that for almost every case there is a rule and a counter-rule 
that would provide an opposite outcome – they wouldn’t have felt the need to, 
e.g., go Inside the Judicial Mind,
6 to enquire into How Judges Decide Cases,
7 or 
to examine the Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations.
8 
  It is important to note, however, that “[t]he realists did not believe … that 
the indeterminancy of legal rules meant that all generalizations are meaningless 
and  that  decisions  are  controlled  only  by  the  psychological  make-up  of  the 
                                                        
3 See generally, e.g., the following seminal works by Felix Cohen and Karl Llewellyn: 
Felix S. Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201 (1931); Felix S. Cohen, 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); and 
Llewellyn, supra note 2. 
4 Some  accounts  point  to  the  work  of  Hugo  Munsterberg  in  the  early  1900s  as  the 
inception of law and psychology in the U.S. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science 
in the Twenty-First Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 7 (2002-2003), referring to HUGO 
MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1908); and Hugo Munsterberg, Yellow Psychology, 11 
LAW NOTES 145 (1907). 
5 Social psychology as an explanation to offer for this too: the mere exposure effect. 
The mere exposure effect is “[t]he finding that repeated exposure to a stimulus (e.g., an object or 
a person) leads to greater liking of the stimulus.” Perhaps because of having learned the law from 
scholarship imbued with the legal realist spirit or because of having been taught by legal realists, 
contemporary  legal  scholars  ended  up  developing  a  liking  for  the  tenets  of  legal  realism. 
THOMAS  GILOVICH,  DACHER  KELTNER,  &  RICHARD  E.  NISBETT,  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  362 
(second edition, 2011). 
6 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001). 
7 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: 
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007). 
8 See Garold Stasser, Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray, The Social Psychology Of Jury 
Deliberations: Structure, Process, and Product, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 221 
(Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982).   4 
judge.”
9 Llewellyn argued that decision-makers exercise a common professional 
“situation sense” that allows them to grasp the meaning that should impregnate 
highly  abstract  legal  concepts.  These  shared  understandings  of  the  law, 
Llewellyn claimed, are crucial in determining the outcomes of cases – more so 
than the individual dispositions of legal decision-makers.
10  But that does not 
invalidate my claim that legal realism is the ideological seed of law and mind 
sciences. Legal realists paved the way for the law and mind sciences not by 
advocating that the foundations of legal decisions lie in psychological factors, 
but in a more subtle way: By popping up the formalist balloon, the realists made 
the legal scholarly community understand that the true reason for the outcome of 
cases does not lie on legal rules alone. Harvard Law Professor Joseph Singer, 
summarizing the influence of legal realism on legal thought, wrote that 
 
[it] has fundamentally altered our conceptions of legal reasoning 
and of the relationship between law and society. The legal realists 
were  remarkably  successful  …  in  changing  the  terms  of  legal 
discourse  ….  All  major  current  schools  of  thought  are,  in 
significant way, products of legal realism. To some extent, we are 
all realists now.
11 
 
And if legal realism laid the ideological foundations of the law and mind sciences 
movement in general, Roscoe Pound, precisely by endorsing legal realism, did so 
at Harvard. In 1931, during his deanship, Pound published The Call for a Realist 
Jurisprudence,
12  where  he  delineates  “a  program  of  relativist-realist 
jurisprudence”.
13 This  program  of  jurisprudence  was  based  on  a  series  of 
elements, among which was “A theory of interests and of the ends of the legal 
order  based  on  or  consistent  with  modern  psychology.”
14 Such  proposal  was 
advanced in the wake of the recognition that “[p]sychological exposure of the 
rôle of reason in human behavior, of the extent to which so-called reasons come 
after action as explanations instead of before action as determining factors, has 
made a profound impression upon the rising generation of jurists.”
15 Moreover, 
“[a]long with the assertion that the sole valid approach is by way of psychology”, 
                                                        
9 Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 470 (1988) (reviewing 
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986)). 
10 Jerome Frank, on the other hand, seemed to assign greater weight to the individual 
differences between judges and their background. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN 
MIND (1930). 
11 Singer, supra note 9, at 467. 
12 Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 197 (1931). 
13 Id., at 710. 
14 Id., at 711. 
15 Id., at 704-5. MIND SCIENCES IN THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM  5 
Pound  associated  with  legal  realism  “a  presupposition  that  some  one 
psychological  starting  point  is  the  unum  necessarium”  for  legal  reasoning.
16 
Regardless  of  whether  or  not  legal  realists  identified  themselves  with  this 
description (Llewellyn seemed to find a substantial part of Pound’s description to 
be inaccurate
17), Dean Pound’s account represents a very powerful endorsement 
of legal realism as psychological realism
18 at Harvard Law School. 
  Before making this endorsement, however, Dean Pound had already taken 
practical measures that were in line with the essence of this psychological realism 
that he believed to be the way forward in legal jurisprudence. Pound’s belief that 
not  only  law  professors,  but  also  judges  and  lawyers,  should  draw  on  the 
teachings of social sciences and empirical studies in making law develop,
19 had 
repercussions in his hiring decisions. In 1929, Pound offered Sheldon Glueck a 
position  as  assistant  professor,  while  his  wife,  Eleanor  Glueck,  had  already 
become a research assistant at the Law School in 1928, where she would work 
for the rest of her life.
20 Sheldon, who later became the first Pound Professor of 
Law, and Eleanor formed “a husband-and-wife team whose numerous studies of 
criminal  behavior  and  of  the  results  of  correctional  treatment  profoundly 
                                                        
16 Id., at 705. 
17 In his response to Pound, Llewellyn sharply criticized some points of the Dean’s 
description of the legal realists. Specifically, Llewellyn found that none of the twenty scholars 
representative of the legal realist movement had ever supported the “ presupposition that some 
one  of  the  competing  psychologies  is  the  unum  necessarium  for  jurisprudence.”  Llewellyn, 
supra note 2, 1230-31. 
18 More  recently,  other  authors  have  proposed  an  understanding  of  legal  realism  as 
psychological realism. See Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Legal Realism as Psychological 
and  Cultural  (not  Political)  Realism,  in  HOW  LAW  KNOWS  (A.  Sarat,  L.  Douglas,  &  M. 
Umphrey  eds.,  2007)  (claiming  that  a  conception  of  legal  realism  that  would  recognize  the 
influence of cultural values on human decision-making, and thus on law, would provide a more 
accurate account of the legal system than the traditional realism). 
19 This belief was made public as early as 1911, when Pound published The Scope and 
Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, before becoming Dean of Harvard Law School.  See 
Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 
(1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1911-12). 
20 For  a  concise,  yet  very  complete,  biography  of  Eleanor  Glueck,  including  a 
description of the work she conducted with her husband, see BARBARA SICHERMAN & CAROL H. 
GREEN  (EDS.),  NOTABLE  AMERICAN  WOMEN:  THE  MODERN  PERIOD:  A  BIOGRAPHICAL 
DICTIONARY 278-80 (1986). It is interesting to note that Eleanor became a research associate in 
1953, but was never offered a position as professor. In 1972, the year of Eleanor’s death, HLS 
granted tenure to a woman for the first time. See Emily Newburger, A Class Unto Themselves, 
Harvard  Law  Bulletin  (Summer  2003), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/2003/summer/feature_3-1.html, and Susan F. Kinsley, 
Harvard’s Affirmative Action Plan: Slow Progress for Women, Blacks, The Harvard Crimson 
(1973),  http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1973/6/14/harvards-affirmative-action-plan-slow-
progress/ .   6 
influenced criminal justice, both legislatively and administratively.”
21 Inspired by 
Richard C. Cabot of the Harvard’s Department of Social Ethics, Sheldon and 
Eleanor started conducting follow-ups of criminals sentenced to reformatories.
22 
Sheldon and Eleanor became pioneers in empirical mind research applied to the 
study  of  criminal  character  and  behavior,  and  published  a  series  of  books 
detailing  their  studies.  “The  Gluecks  worked  together  closely  on  each  book: 
Sheldon had a penchant for the legal, psychiatric, and literary aspects of the work, 
while Eleanor’s province was the practical, statistical, and field work.”
23 They 
later narrowed down their interest to the problem of juvenile delinquency and, in 
1950, published the results of an ambitious project directed at understanding “the 
causes,  prevention,  prediction,  and  treatment  of  juvenile  delinquency”
24 in 
Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency.
25 The interest in juvenile delinquency came up 
as a natural combination of their distinct and eclectic educational backgrounds: 
Sheldon had a Ph.D. crosscutting the areas of sociology, law, and psychiatry, 
while Eleanor had a masters (Ed.M.) and a doctorate (Ed.D.) in education.
26 
  In  sum,  in  terms  of  interdisciplinary  research  involving  contributions 
from the mind sciences, Sheldon and Eleanor were ahead of their time. Their 
recruitment can be considered a practical repercussion, even if only a modest one, 
of Dean Pound’s belief that Harvard Law School needed faculty who sought 
guidance in social empiricism and mind sciences in conducting their studies. But, 
regardless of having remained a mentor of Sheldon’s and an active fundraiser for 
his and Eleanor’s research, it didn’t take long for Pound to change his mind 
regarding the influence that legal realism as he conceived it to be, and hence of 
psychology and empirical studies, should play in legal education. Only a year 
after  the  publication  of  The  Call  for  a  Realist  Jurisprudence,  Pound  was 
“accus[ing] the law professors he labeled realists of exaggerating the unreliability 
of legal rules, blindly engaging in empirical work without considering its purpose, 
overemphasizing judicial psychoanalysis, and neglecting the role of moral values 
in law.”
27 Psychology, Pound argued, should be studied in college, not in law 
school.
28 According to Laura Kalman, Pound’s assertions against legal realism 
succeeded in keeping its influence away from the HLS curriculum and faculty 
                                                        
21  Sheldon  Glueck  and  Eleanor  Glueck,  Britannica  Online  Encyclopaedia, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1353094/Sheldon-Glueck-and-Eleanor-Glueck . 
22 See id., and SICHERMAN & GREEN, supra note 20, at 279. 
23 SICHERMAN & GREEN, supra note 20, at 279. 
24 Id. 
25 See SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
(1950). 
26 See John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, The Sutherland-Glueck Debate: On the 
Sociology of Criminological Knowledge, 96 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 1402 (1991).  
27 LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 46 (1986). 
28 See id., at 56. MIND SCIENCES IN THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM  7 
recruitment: innovativeness was not a characteristic of HLS professors and the 
marasmus was permeating the curriculum.
29 The consequence, Kalman suggests, 
was a “reluctance to expand the curriculum to increase students’ awareness of 
law’s  relationship  with  the  social  sciences”,  including  psychology,  reluctance 
which was due to “a fear of being perceived as ‘soft.’”
30 
  It bears noting, however, that this part of the paper is not intended to be 
an investigation of the history of legal innovations, in general, and legal realism, 
in particular, at HLS. Its goal, which I hope to have fulfilled, was to provide a 
general understanding of the theoretical movements that preceded the birth of law 
and mind sciences at Harvard, and that serve as the background for the curricular 
analysis that follows. 
 
II. MIND SCIENCES IN THE HLS CURRICULUM FROM 1957 TO 2013 
In this part of the paper, I will report the findings of a study that involved going 
over fifty-three course catalogues in order to identify courses in law and mind 
sciences in the HLS curriculum.
31 Catalogues were available in print from 1957 
to 2005. The catalogues from 2005 onwards could be found online.
32 
  Before moving into an analysis of the findings of this study, a distinction 
that  will  be  used  throughout  the  paper  must  be  apprehended:  that  between 
“perfect” law and mind sciences courses and “imperfect” law and mind sciences 
courses.  This  duality,  admittedly  a  subjective  one,  aims  at  differentiating 
between i) courses that either directly explore the intersection between law and a 
particular science of the mind (which will typically be “law and” courses, like 
“Law  and  Cognition”,  “Law  and  Neuroscience”,  “Law  and  Psychology”), 
discussing the implications of that particular science for legal decision-making 
and legal theory, or that explore another topic, but do so by drawing mainly from 
insights of one or more mind sciences (e.g., “The Prediction and Prevention of 
Harmful Conduct”, “Negotiation: Dealing with Emotions”), and ii) courses that 
assign some readings on psychology and other mind sciences and that discuss 
their contributions to a thorough understanding of the course topic, but that don’t 
have their crux in that discussion. The former are what I call “perfect law and 
mind sciences courses”; the latter “imperfect law and mind sciences courses”. 
The  subsumption  of  a  course  in  either  of  these  two  categories  was  entirely 
                                                        
29 See id., at 64. 
30 Id., at 66. 
31 The 1972-73, 1973-74, and 1982-83 catalogues were missing. 
32 The course catalogues from 1957 to 2005 can be found in the HLS Registrar’s Office 
and  can  be  consulted  upon  request.  The  catalogues  from  2010  to  2013  are  available  at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/. For the catalogues of the years 2005 
to 2009, I used the Wayback Machine (http://archive.org/web/web.php), a service that enables 
users to consult archived versions of webpages across time.    8 
discretionary.  If  the  categorization  of  some  courses  is  clear-cut  –  normally, 
courses that are undoubtedly “perfect” courses, like the “law and’s” – the line 
between  courses  that  draw  substantially  on  insights  of  mind  sciences,  and 
courses that draw on those insights, but not in a substantial way, is a blurry one. 
Some heuristics were used in the process of categorization. For instance, if a 
course was in the borderline between perfect and imperfect, but was taught by 
someone with training in mind sciences or that had consistently been teaching 
“perfect” courses throughout his or her career, I would consider the course a 
“perfect” course. 
Six different trends, and one predicted future trend, of the presence of the 
mind sciences in the law curriculum were identified. Although these trends can 
be spotted in the chart below in a pretty clear way, it bears noting that they too 
are  the  product  of  a  subjective  judgment:  First,  because  they  are  based 
essentially on the abovementioned distinction. Even though I will present and 
discuss the influence of some of the “imperfect” courses, these courses were not 
considered for purposes of identifying the trends. The chart is representative of 
the evolution of the presence of “perfect” courses only. Second, because I used 
no  baselines  to  identify  these  trends. The  trends  were  not  identified  because 
during  a  certain  number  of  consecutive  years  the  number  of  mind  sciences 
courses was above or below a certain baseline; they were extracted from the 
patterns yielded by the graph and are relative to each other. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Column chart and moving average line representing the evolution of the number of 
“perfect” law and mind sciences courses from 1957 to 2013. The different trends are represented 
with different colors: green for the “birth”; pink for the stabilization periods; golden for the golden 
periods; and grey for the crisis. MIND SCIENCES IN THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM  9 
Moreover, it must be noted that the character of the paper is one of sole 
exploration: it merely analyzes the trends in terms of the absolute number of law 
and  mind  sciences  courses  offered  over  time.  In  other  words,  the  following 
analysis is based on raw numbers, and not on a proportion of mind sciences 
courses over the total number of courses offered per year. The possibility that 
this proportion has decreased throughout these fifty-six years is a real one. My 
intuition tells me that the number of mind sciences courses per total number of 
courses has, in fact, decreased, much like what must have happened with almost 
all  the  other  subject  areas,  due  to  the  boom  in  total  number  of  courses  that 
occurred around the 1970s – a number that has been permanently increasing. 
 
1. 1957-64: Auguries of Mind Sciences 
The period between 1957, year that marks the beginning of my study, and 1964 
shows  only  some  modest  contributions  of  the  mind  sciences  to  the  HLS 
curriculum.  From  1957  to  1963,  Sheldon  Glueck  was  still  a  member  of  the 
faculty at HLS, where he taught a course that reflected his and his wife’s main 
research interest: “The Problem of Juvenile Delinquency”, a seminar which dealt 
“with the legal, social and psychiatric problems pertaining to child delinquency 
and  embryonic  criminalism.”
33 Apart  from  Glueck’s  course,  only  one  more 
course had a connection with the mind sciences. In “Medico-Legal Problems”, 
William J. Curran explored “the relation of law and medicine, particularly the 
considerations involved when members of the legal and health professions must 
cooperate in analyzing major medico-legal problems.”
34 One of the many topics 
discussed was “legal psychiatry including orientation to human behavior and 
determination of mental competence.”
35 
  During  this  period,  Yale  Law  School  was  taking  concrete  steps  to 
increase the influence of the mind sciences over its students. In 1961, Dean 
Eugene Rostow invited Anna Freud to join the faculty, of which Jay Katz, a 
psychoanalyst, and Joseph Goldstein, a scholar whose “greatest impact on legal 
scholarship and practice was in the intersection among the disciplines of law, 
psychiatry and psychoanalysis”,
36 were already members. As visiting professor, 
Anna Freud would participate in class meetings in “Family Law” and “Criminal 
Law” – taught, respectively, by Katz and Goldstein, who would incorporate a 
great  deal  of  psychiatry  and  psychoanalytic  theory  into  their  teaching  –  and 
                                                        
33 The Catalogue of the Law School, LIV Official Register of Harvard University 55 
(1957-58). 
34 Id., at 58. 
35 Id. 
36 Obituary: Joseph Goldstein Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law at Yale Law School, 
http://news.yale.edu/2000/03/15/obituary-joseph-goldstein-sterling-professor-emeritus-law-yale-
law-school.    10 
teach a seminar in “Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence”.
37 At the same time, at 
Harvard, apart from the two mentioned courses bridging the gap between some 
legal and social policy topics and psychiatry, no other source of influence of the 
mind  sciences  in  the  HLS  curriculum  existed.  Hence  the  title  of  this  trend: 
auguries are but signs of something that is coming. These two courses can hardly 
be considered to constitute the birth of the mind sciences in the law curriculum; 
but they somehow indicate that some curricular phenomenon is about to unfold. 
If that phenomenon was a spontaneous one or a reaction to what was happening 
at Yale is something that one can only speculate about.  
 
2. 1964-69: Inception of the Mind Sciences in the HLS Curriculum 
The curricular year of 1964-65 saw the birth of “perfect” mind sciences courses 
in the HLS curriculum. “Designed to familiarize the law student with theories of 
behavior  and  to  explore  their  relevance  to  legal  problems”
38,  the  course  in 
“Psychiatry,  Psychoanalysis  and  the  Law”  reflected  an  awareness  of  the 
importance of studying the workings of the psyche in order to attain a genuine 
understanding  of  certain  legal  topics.  The  course  focused  on  “one  particular 
theory of behavior: psychoanalytic. With basic concepts of this theory in mind – 
though constantly reexamined and challenged – [it] … explored their utility in 
giving content to one pervasive legal concept: ‘competency’.”
39 It is curious to 
note that the course was taught by then Assistant Professor Alan Dershowitz, 
who graduated from Yale Law School with a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) in 1962, 
with the participation of Jay Katz, Associate Professor of Law and Associate 
Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Yale. Dershowitz, despite never having been 
taught  by  Anna  Freud,  who  started  teaching  at  Yale  precisely  in  1962,  was 
inspired by the approach adopted by Katz and Goldstein in the courses they 
taught at Yale, and brought that approach into the Harvard classrooms. 
  The  course  suffered  some  changes  in  the  years  that  followed  its 
introduction in the curriculum. In 1965, the course seems to be split in two: one 
course dealing mainly with the interconnections among psychoanalytic theory 
and the law;
40 and the other dealing with the issue of mental illness
41 (one of the 
                                                        
37 See Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, 92 YALE L. J. 219, 219-20 (1982). 
38 The Catalogue of the Law School, LXI Official Register of Harvard University 74 
(1964). 
39 Id. 
40 See The Catalogue of the Law School, LXII Official Register of Harvard University 
73 (1965) (the course “speculate[s] about the possible relevance of this [psychoanalytic] theory 
to such legal issues as: conscious and unconscious intent and mistake in the law of wills, crimes, 
divorce and torts; guilt feelings and actual guilt in the law of evidence, crimes and employment; 
perception,  rationality  and  memory  in  the  law  of  evidence,  torts  and  crimes;  coercion  and 
voluntariness in the law of the military, confessions, insurance, free press and race relations; and MIND SCIENCES IN THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM  11 
topics  that  was  briefly  discussed  in  the  1964-65  course
42).  Alan  Dershowitz 
taught both courses, this time not with the participation of Jay Katz, but of Alan 
Stone, Associate Professor in Psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School. This 
was the first contribution of Alan Stone to the HLS curriculum, a contribution 
that represented the beginning of a long and successful marriage between law, 
psychology,  and  psychiatry  in  the  HLS  curriculum.  Stone,  who  graduated  in 
psychology  from  Harvard  College  in  1950,  and  earned  his  M.D.  from  Yale 
Medical  School  in  1955,  first  earned  a  position  as  lecturer  at  Harvard  Law 
School in 1969 and was (aptly) appointed Touroff-Glueck Professor of Law and 
Psychiatry in 1982.
43 In 1983-84, Stone started teaching the course “Psychiatry 
and the Law”
44 – a course that endured the passage of time, being still offered in 
2012-13 as a reading group.
45 Despite Katz’s leaving, the influence of Yale was 
still  very  much  present  in  this  small  curricular  niche  at  HLS.  First,  both 
Dershowitz and Stone earned degrees from Yale. Second, the materials used 
both for “Psychoanalytic Theory and the Law” and for “The Legal Status of the 
Mentally  Ill”  were  mimeographed  from  the  book  co-authored  by  Jay  Katz, 
Joseph Goldstein, and Alan M. Dershowitz, Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and the 
Law, published in 1967.
46 
                                                                                                                                                     
prediction  and  ‘postdiction’  in  the  law  of  juvenile  delinquency,  criminal  attempts,  and  civil 
commitment.”). 
41 See Id., at 71 (“This seminar will be devoted to an exploration of the variety of 
processes by which our society designates some of its members as ‘mentally ill’ and ‘mentally 
healthy’; and to an evaluation of the consequences of such designations in light of their purposes. 
Drawing on such materials as hospital record, psychiatric and psychological reports, … and 
writings  of  behavioral  scientists,  we  will  focus  in  detail  on  two  major  problems:  (1)  the 
substantive and procedural rules governing the involuntary confinement in, and release from, 
mental hospitals; and (2) the relevance of mental ‘health’ or ‘illness’ in determining who is 
‘competent’ to establish legal relationships (e.g., contractual, familial, tortious, testamentary), to 
participate in the legal process (as e.g., judge, juror, witness, defendant, lawyer, subject for 
execution,  psychiatrist),  and  to  assume  a  variety  of  other  responsibilities  (e.g.,  policeman, 
teacher, citizen, soldier, employer, employee).”). 
42 See The Catalogue of the Law School (1964), supra note 38, at 74 (the course “will 
also touch on: … assumptions underlying the legal treatment of mental illness sometimes as a 
provoking event (civil commitment), other times as an ‘excusing’ condition (insanity defense).”). 
43  Alan  Stone’s  faculty  page  at  Harvard  Law  School, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=73.  
44 There  is  a  strong  possibility  that  the  course  was  offered  for  the  first  time  in  the 
curricular year of 1982-83, after Stone’s appointment as Touroff-Glueck Professor of Law and 
Psychiatry. However, that year’s catalogue was missing from the Registrar’s Office, so I cannot 
be sure of that. 
45 See http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/index.html.  
46 See  JAY KATZ,  JOSEPH  GOLDSTEIN,  &  ALAN  M.  DERSHOWITZ,  PSYCHOANALYSIS, 
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1967).   12 
  In 1966-67, the course “The Legal Status of the Mentally Ill” did not 
feature in the curriculum, but a course with some degree of overlap with it was 
added: In “The Prediction and Prevention of Anti-Social Conduct”, Dershowitz 
and  Stone  “consider[ed]  the  variety  of  devices  which  authorize  the  state  to 
intervene and prevent certain socially harmful results before their consummation. 
…  [The  course  examined]  one  particular  predictive-preventive  device  – 
commitment of dangerous mentally ill persons – in great detail.”
47 From 1968-
69 onwards, however, the three courses – “The Prediction and Prevention of 
Harmful  Conduct”,  “Psychoanalytic  Theory  and  Legal  Assumptions”,  and 
“Mental Abnormality and the Law” (now taught by Stone alone, using the case 
method and materials extracted from Stone & Stone, The Abnormal Personality 
Through Literature
48)
49 – co-existed in the curriculum. 
  Throughout  this  period,  “Medico-Legal  Problems”  was  a  constant 
presence  in  the  curriculum,  while  other  “imperfect”  law  and  mind  sciences 
courses were introduced: “Human Relations Problems in Legal Practice” aimed, 
among  other  things,  to  “increase  the  future  lawyer’s  …  sensitivity  to  the 
behavioral forces that may be operative” in the course of their work;
50 “Youth 
and Crime”, following a reappearance of “Juvenile Delinquency” for one year 
(taught by Livingston Hall),
51 made “a detailed comparative analysis of current 
major  theories  of  deviant  conduct  [by  children]  drawn  primarily  from 
psychological,  social  and  cultural  modes  of  explanation”;
52 and  “Law  and 
Sociology”,  which,  despite  sociology  not  being  a  mind  science  unlike  social 
psychology,
53 gave consideration to writings in this branch of psychology.
54 
                                                        
47 The Catalogue of the Law School, LXIII Official Register of Harvard University 80-
81 (1966). 
48 See  ALAN  A.  STONE  &  SUE  S.  STONE  (EDS.),  THE  ABNORMAL  PERSONALITY 
THROUGH LITERATURE (1966). 
49 See The Catalogue of the Law School, LXV Official Register of Harvard University 
92 (1968). 
50 The Catalogue of the Law School (1966), supra note 47, at 65. In 1971-72, the term 
“behavioral forces” was replaced by “emotional and psychological forces”. See The Catalogue 
of the Law School, LXVIII Official Register of Harvard University 80 (1971). 
51 Id., at 67. 
52 The Catalogue of the Law School, LXIV Official Register of Harvard University 92 
(1967). 
53 There is often confusion regarding the distinction between social psychology and 
sociology. Although there is a great degree of overlap between both, the difference is one of 
perspective: 
Where  sociology  attempts  to  explain  the  macro  and  micro  environmental 
variables that influence peoples’ behavior, social psychology hones in on the 
individual  influences  and  behaviors  that  enable  us  to  predict  and  better 
understand  people’s  thoughts  and  behaviors.  …  Perhaps  the  best  way  to 
describe social psychology through use of example is by contrasting it against 
sociology. Let’s take the issue of marriage and divorce. If divorce rates start to MIND SCIENCES IN THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM  13 
  Based on the considerable number of courses drawing on insights from 
the mind sciences that bloomed during the years 1964-69, it is safe to say that 
this period corresponded to the inception of the mind sciences as an established 
curricular phenomenon at HLS. This inception was much due to the influence of 
Dershowitz and Stone, an influence that would span decades. Also, outside HLS, 
awareness of the value of the mind sciences for deepening the understanding of 
law and legal theory was increasing: the American Psychology-Law Society was 
founded in the late 1960s.  
Having  detected  this  movement  towards  a  greater  exploration  of  the 
interactions  between  law  and  certain  mind  sciences,  the  question  about  the 
reasons  underlying  it  is  in  order.  Why  did  the  law  curriculum  suddenly 
incorporate mind science disciplines? Since these disciplines develop outside the 
law  school  and  are  the  result  of  research  and  scholarly  communication  that 
happens outside the legal academic environment, I hypothesized that the law 
school curriculum was reacting to such developments, by incorporating insights 
that were growing in popularity in their respective fields. As the figures below 
show, a search in Google Ngram Viewer – a service that allow users to trace the 
use of strings of words (and, consequently, of concepts and ideas) over the last 
years, decades, even centuries, through a visualization of the rise and fall of 
particular stings of words across 5 million books – supports this hypothesis. The 
peaks  in  the  graphs  represent  a  growth  in  usage  of  the  terms  “psychiatry”, 
“psychoanalytic theory”, and “mental health”. This growth in usage seems to 
illustrate a growth in popularity of these concepts in their respective domains. 
Concepts  and  ideas  are  likely  to  be  discussed  and  subject  to  scrutiny  in  the 
domains  in  which  they  were  generated  first.  After  being  sanctioned  by  the 
gatekeepers of the domain, these concepts and ideas spread across other fields of 
studies that might benefit from the import thereof. I argue that this is what the 
law curriculum did. After the growth of the body of knowledge in psychiatry, 
psychoanalysis and mental illness and the recognition of its scientific validity, 
the  law  school  proceeded  to  import  this  knowledge.  Nonetheless,  the  graphs 
seem  to  suggest  that  these  developments  start  occurring  some  twenty  years 
before they are incorporated into the HLS curriculum. The sharp increase in the 
usage of the three terms searched for starts around the late 1940s and only in 
mid-to-late 1960s do they appear in the law curriculum. However, the accuracy 
                                                                                                                                                     
spike, a sociologist might start to look at how economic and societal pressures 
have  pressed  on  the  fabrics  of  the  marriage  and  tested  its  strength.  Social 
psychologists, however, would take it a step further and example how such 
pressures are interpreted by couples in marriage and how they respond to them. 
Jesse Lawson, Difference between Sociology and Social Psychology, Lawsonry – The Online 
Journal  for  Social  Progress,  http://www.lawsonry.com/674-difference-between-sociology-and-
social-psychology/ (citations omitted). 
54 See The Catalogue of the Law School (1965), supra note 40, at 70.   14 
of  graphs  generated  by  Google  Ngram  Viewer  such  as  these  must  not  be 
exaggerated. Google Ngram Viewer’s reliability has been questioned, mainly 
due  to  its  inability  to  take  the  context  in  which  the  word  is  inserted  into 
account
55 and  to  problems  with  the  optical  character  recognition  system  on 
which it is based.
56 Nevertheless, and although this data is not indubitable proof 
of the above-stated hypothesis, the consistency in the patterns of the three graphs 
offers some support for it. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
55 See http://aelang.net/wordpress/2011/10/ngrams-the-perfect-little-assistant-to-life/.  
56See Danny Sullivan, When OCR Goes Bad: Google’s Ngram Viewer & The F-Word, 
http://searchengineland.com/when-ocr-goes-bad-googles-ngram-viewer-the-f-word-59181 . 
Figure 2 – Evolution of the use of the term “psychiatry” from 1800 to 2000. 
Figure 3 – Evolution of the use of the term “psychoanalytic theory” from 1800 to 2000. MIND SCIENCES IN THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM  15 
 
 
 
3. 1969-89: The First Stabilization Period 
The period between 1969 and 1989 was one of little fluctuation in the number of 
both “perfect” and “imperfect” mind sciences courses in the HLS curriculum. 
Courses like “Prediction and Prevention of Harmful Conduct”, “Psychoanalytic 
Theory and Legal Assumptions”, “Mental Abnormality and the Law” take root 
in the curriculum. Some courses requiring some readings in psychology – like 
“The  Lawyer  as  a  Negotiator”,
57 “Interdisciplinary  Approaches  to  Dispute 
Settlement”,
58 and “Jurisprudence – Knowing, Reasoning and Judging”
59 – made 
brief appearances in the curriculum throughout this period. It is worth noting 
than  in  the  80s  the  number  of  interdisciplinary  courses  started  to  increase 
exponentially; the number of mind sciences courses did not, however, increase 
in a proportional way. 
                                                        
57 See The Catalogue of the Law School, LXXII Official Register of Harvard University 
141 (1975) (“The materials used in this course consist of writings by lawyers, psychologists, and 
psychiatrists. … Other materials, such as those chosen from social psychology, deal with the 
negotiation process only tangentially.”) 
58 See The Catalogue of the Law School 80 (1980) (“This course will study the different 
ways that legal professionals, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, psychologists, 
and historians think about such problems in the dispute settlement as access to justice and court 
congestion … .”) 
59 See The Catalogue of the Law School 135-36 (1988) (“The study and practice of law 
depends  on  claims  and  activities  of  knowing,  reasoning,  and  judging.  …  Twentieth  century 
scholars in psychology, physics, philosophy, religion and other fields have articulated sharply 
contradicting ideas about how we know, what counts as reason, and how, why, and when we 
judge. This seminar will frame a conversation between legal thinkers and scholars from other 
disciplines about these themes.”). 
Figure 4 – Evolution of the use of the term “mental health” from 1800 to 2000.   16 
  Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, in 1983-84, after Alan Stone got 
the Touroff-Glueck chair, the course in “Psychiatry and the Law” was born. The 
course has been available, although not continuously, for almost 30 years, being 
still offered in 2012-13. 
  This stagnation did not reflect what was happening in the legal realm. 
Several fora for dissemination of research in law and mind sciences have been 
created since the 1970s, like the journals Law and Human Behavior, Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law, and Law and Psychology Review. Moreover, in courts, 
too,  psychology  became  more  and  more  used:  “[e]xpert  testimony  on 
psychological and psychiatric issues became more accepted … and the use of 
various psychological syndromes became increasingly common … as defenses 
to  criminal  charges.”
60 Harvard’s  curricular  response  to  this  explosion  in 
popularity  of  law  and  mind  sciences  in  general,  and  law  and  psychology  in 
particular, seemed to come in the years 1989 to 1997. 
 
4. 1989-97: The First Golden Period 
The twenty years of relative stagnation of the influence of the mind sciences in 
the HLS curriculum were followed by a period of great diversification both in 
the courses exploring the implications of the study of the mind to the law and in 
the  faculty  teaching  this  kind  of  courses.  In  addition  to  the  already-classic 
“Prediction and Prevention of Harmful Conduct”, “Psychiatry and the Law”, and 
“Psychoanalytic Theory and Legal Assumptions”, three courses that I considered 
to be “perfect” mind sciences courses were added.  
Roberto Unger joined Alan Stone in “explor[ing] certain modern ideas 
about the forms of individual happiness that satisfy an ambitious, but defensible 
conception of who we are or what we might become.”
61 In “Modern Promises of 
Happiness”,  while  Unger  “approache[d]  these  ideas  from  the  twofold 
perspective  of  their  connection  with  the  progress  of  democracy  and  of  their 
ambivalence toward the moral teachings of Christianity”,
62 Alan Stone, “from 
the standpoint of psychoanalytic theory, consider[ed] the promises of happiness 
as they relate to the history of desire in the individual and the development of 
personal identity.”
63 
Alan Dershowitz invited Stephen Jay Gould, Professor of Geology in the 
Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Alexander Agassiz, Professor of Zoology in the 
Museum of Comparative Zoology, and Robert Nozick, Arthur Kingsley Porter 
Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, to co-teach a course 
in  “Thinking  About  Thinking”.  The  goal  of  the  course  was  to  understand 
                                                        
60 Blumenthal, supra note 4, at 16 (citations omitted). 
61 See, e.g., The Catalogue of the Law School (1989). 
62 Id. 
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“distinctive modes of thinking in three fields. Topics … include[d]: prediction of 
the future; reconstruction of the past; probabilistic inferences; particular moral, 
social and religious issues.”
64 
Connecting  his  interests  in  law,  psychiatry,  and  cinema
65 together,  in 
1996-97, Stone started teaching a seminar in “Law, Psychology and Morality: 
An  Exploration  Using  Film”,  examining  “subjects  at  the  intersection  of  law, 
psychology, and morality using film and film commentary as text.”
66 
Furthermore, from 1991 to 1996, Charles Nesson and David Cope – who 
would later integrate the new wave of law and mind sciences teachers at HLS – 
offered a course in “The Persuasive Power of Moral Argument”, that included 
readings from a number of disciplines, including psychology.
67 
The curricular year of 1989-90 is a year of pronounced prevalence of the 
mind sciences in relation to law and economics, at least in terms of curricular 
offerings. Under the heading of “Law & Other Disciplines”, while there were 
just two courses in economic analysis of law, taught by Steven Shavell, Lucian 
Bebchuk, and Louis Kaplow, there were five “perfect” law and mind courses.
68 
This prevalence did not reflect the balance of forces between law and economics 
and law and mind sciences in legal scholarship. In fact, the panorama in legal 
scholarship was (and still is) quite the opposite of that in the HLS curriculum in 
the  early  1990s.  If  psychology  and  other  related  mind  sciences  never  really 
enjoyed  widespread  popularity  as  a  framework  for  analysis  of  the  law, 
economics did, although certainly more in the United States than in Europe.
69 
Among  all  the  interdisciplinary  approaches  to  the  law,  law  and  economics 
occupied  an  almost  dominant  position  in  American  legal  scholarship.  Judge 
Posner’s words help summarize this dominance: 
 
Economic  analysis  of  law  has  grown  rapidly,  has  become  the 
largest, most pervasive interdisciplinary field of legal studies in 
the history of American law, has palpably influenced the practice 
of law and judicial decisions, has launched lucrative consulting 
spin-offs,  has  spawned  courses  and  textbooks  in  economic 
analysis of law, has influenced legislation (economic analysis of 
                                                        
64 Id. 
65 Alan Stone serves as the film critic for the Boston Review. 
66 The Catalogue of the Law School (1996). 
67 See, e.g., The Catalogue of the Law School 152 (1991) 
68 See The Catalogue of the Law School 49 (1989). 
69 See Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and 
Economics in Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555 (2008) (arguing that the fact 
that the American market in higher education, in general, and in legal education, in particular, is 
much more competitive than the European market is the crucial explanation for this difference in 
receptivity to law and economics and to other types of legal innovations.).   18 
law played an important role in the deregulation movement), has 
made it de rigueur for law schools of the first and second ranks to 
have  one  or  more  economists  on  their  faculty,  has  seeded  a 
number of its practitioners in university administration and the 
federal  judiciary,  and  has  now  crossed  the  Atlantic  and  begun 
making rapid gains in Europe.
70 
 
Indeed, “[e]conomists are popular. Well, perhaps not at dinner parties, 
but there is no disputing that within universities, think tanks, and government 
agencies, their ideas dominate the scene. In legal academia … no other approach 
has been as influential as law and economics over the last half-century.”
71 This 
prevalence  of  economics  in  relation  to  psychology  may  be  explained  by  a 
fundamental difference in discourse between these two disciplines. Psychology’s 
discourse  is  probabilistic,  in  that  it  aims  at  describing  the  likelihood  that  a 
certain  action  or  event  will  occur.  Differently,  the  discourse  of  economists 
emanates surety, being characterized by a higher degree of certainty, hence more 
in tune with the legal discourse.
72 Thus, economic research tends to permeate 
legal studies more easily than psychological research. Adam Benforado, David 
Yosifon,  and  Harvard  Law  Professor  Jon  Hanson  offer  an  alternative  and 
somewhat more subtle explanation for the prevalence of the law and economics 
approach.  These  authors  argue  that  the  model  of  human  behavior  that 
economists proposed, a dispositionist model that takes human rationality as a 
given,  is  more  in  line  with  our  intuitions  about  ourselves.  We  are  generally 
averse to the idea that our behavior is deeply influenced by the situation we find 
ourselves in and that it is often less dependent on our dispositions than we think 
– and that is the account offered by social psychologists.
73 “Social psychologists 
tend  to  be  situationists  in  a  dispositionist    world.”
74 Against  this  scholarship 
landscape,  the  prevalence  of  the  mind  sciences  over  economics  in  the  HLS 
curriculum in the early 90s is even more remarkable. 
                                                        
70 Richard A. Posner, The Sociology of the Sociology of Law: A View from Economics, 
2 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 265, 275 (1995). 
71 Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Backlash: The Reaction to Mind Sciences in Legal 
Academia, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 501 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012). 
72  Oliver  R.  Goodenough,  Can  Cognitive  Neuroscience  Make  Psychology  a 
Foundational Discipline for the Study of Law?, in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: CURRENT LEGAL 
ISSUES VOLUME 9 77, 78 (Belinda Brooks-Gordon & Michael Freeman eds., 2006). (suggesting 
that “[t]here is a triumphalism in the tone of law and economics writers that contrasts with the 
more tentative tone of law and psychology.”) 
73 See Benforado & Hanson, supra note 71, at 501-2; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, 
The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, 
and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 142-154 (2003-2004). 
74 Benforado & Hanson, supra note 71, at 503. MIND SCIENCES IN THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM  19 
But this economic ethos of legal scholarship may change in response to 
new  ideas  and  forces.  Indeed,  as  it  shall  be  seen,  there  are  reasons  to  be 
optimistic in what regards the influence of psychology on legal studies. 
 
5. 1997-2000: Crisis 
1997-98  was  the  annus  horribilis  of  the  mind  sciences  in  the  Harvard  Law 
curriculum, at least in relation to law and economics. Students were offered six 
courses  in  economic  analysis  of  law  –  “Economic  Analysis  of  Law”, 
“Economics and Public Law”, “Economics of Regulation and Antitrust”, “Law 
and  Economics”,  “Law  and  Economics:  Research  Seminar”,  and  “Law  and 
Economics: Empirical Issues” – and only two in the intersection between law 
and  mind  sciences  –  “Psychiatry  and  the  Law”  and  “Law,  Psychology  and 
Morality”. This meant that there was not only a shift in curricular influence in 
favor of law and economics, but also a sharp decline in the number of mind 
sciences  courses  in  absolute  terms.  The  reincarnation  of  “Thinking  About 
Thinking”  in  1999
75 was  not  enough  to  tilt  the  scales  in  favor  of  the  mind 
sciences again. 
 
6. 2000-10: The Second Golden Period 
For someone who spent days reading course catalogues in search of courses 
related to the mind sciences, the years 2000 represent a truly fascinating period. 
While perusing these ten catalogues, the level of adrenaline in my bloodstream 
increased substantially: new and incredibly interesting law and mind sciences 
courses popped up on every page! 
Behavioralism’s  influence  on  the  law  curriculum  began  to  be  felt  in 
2000-01, with the introduction of two courses. The introduction of “Behavioral 
Law and Economics” resulted from the recognition that the traditional economic 
models of rational behavior were flawed.
76 Decision-making scholars, like Paul 
Slovic, Amos Tversky, and Daniel Kahneman,
77 started incorporating insights 
from psychology into economic studies, by using psychological concepts and 
methods  to  help  understand  the  economic  decisions  of  individuals.  This 
                                                        
75 See The Catalogue of the Law School (1999). 
76 See The Catalogue of the Law School 98 (2000) (“Analyses of legal processes often 
assume that people adhere to certain assumptions regarding rational behavior. A considerable 
emerging literature tests these assumptions using empirical evidence on actual performance of 
litigants and the courts, as well as experimental evidence on decision-making by judges and 
jurors.  …  The  seminar  will  begin  with  a  brief  overview  of  the  principal  findings  in  the 
psychology  and  economics  literature  concerning  the  rationality  of  individual  behavior  in 
general.”). 
77 These authors made invaluable contributions for the launch of the field of behavioral 
economics. Daniel Kahneman’s latest book brings together his and Tversky’s lifetime research 
on judgment and decision-making. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).    20 
eventually  led  to  the  birth  of  behavioral  economics  and,  consequently,  of 
behavioral law and economics. In “Law and Behavioralism”, Jon Hanson – a 
scholar whose role in propelling the impact of the mind sciences in the HLS 
curriculum and in legal scholarship is likely to become as influential as that of 
Alan Dershowitz and Alan Stone in the 60s, 70s and 80s
78 – recognized that 
“[c]ognitive  psychology  and  behavioral  sciences  are  playing  an  increasingly 
important  role  in  legal  theory  and  the  law”
79 and,  accordingly,  analyzed 
behavioralism’s implications for law. 
Jon Hanson, director of the Project on Law and Mind Sciences at HLS 
(PLMS)
80 and editor of The Situationist
81, taught several courses dedicated to an 
investigation of the role of mind sciences in law and policy. In 2005-06, Hanson 
taught a seminar and writing workshop about “Choice” – a social-psychological 
analysis  of  “the  growing  place  and  role  of  ‘choice’  in  conventional 
understandings of laws, markets, and many of the most salient policy debates in 
our  culture  –  including  abortion,  sexual  ‘preference’,  school  options,  social 
security, welfare, election law, and many more.”
82 In 2008-09, leading up to the 
publication of the homonymous book that brought “many of the world’s experts 
on … [ideology, psychology, law and policy] together to examine the sometimes 
unsettling  interactions  between  psychology,  ideology,  and  law,  and  to  better 
understand what, beyond and beneath the logic, animates the law”,
83 taught the 
seminar  “Ideology,  Psychology,  and  Law”.  Although  it  focuses  on  the 
importance  of  studying  the  causes  and  implications  of  ideology,  the  course 
description is a splendid account on why the study of mind sciences can be 
valuable to achieve a more realistic understanding of law and policy: 
 
Most judges and legal scholars tend to disregard or downplay the 
role of ideology in the creation and implementation of laws and in 
the development of legal theory. Similarly, since World War II, 
social scientists have paid surprisingly little attention to ideology 
                                                        
78 That may well be the reason why Jon Hanson will be the first Alan Stone Professor of 
Law, according to what Alan Stone himself told me in conversation. 
79 The Catalogue of the Law School 150 (2000). 
80 The Project is described as “a resource for scholars, students, and citizens with an 
interest in understanding the implications of social psychology and other related mind sciences 
for  law  and  policy.” 
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81 The Situationist is an online forum “for scholars, students, lawyers, policymakers, 
and interested citizens to examine, discuss, and debate the effect of situational forces – that is, 
non-salient factors around and within us – on law, policy, politics, policy theory, and our social, 
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as  a  topic  of  research.  That  is  now  rapidly  changing  as  social 
psychologists  and  other  mind  scientists  have  begun  to  study, 
among  other  things,  the  characteristics  and  situations  of  people 
drawn  to  different  dogmas.  The  latest  research  suggests  that 
ideology is more a manifestation of implicit processes, motives, 
and human needs than a product of careful reasoning and explicit 
choices. The evidence indicates that when we embrace an ideology 
or claim to rise above it--whether as citizens, judges or scholars--
our efforts are motivated and often undermined by our social and 
psychological situations. The seminar will be built largely around 
chapters of a book now in progress in which mind scientists and 
legal scholars examine the most recent research on the sources and 
consequences of ideology and discuss the possible implications of 
that research for policy, politics, law and legal theory.
84 
 
One idea around which much of Hanson’s scholarship has revolved is that of 
situationism.
85 Situationism refers to the idea according to which “[w]e are too 
ready to read personality and character traits into the behavioral drama and too 
resistant  to  see  stage  settings  as  the  basis  for  the  action.”
86 This  tendency  to 
attribute behavior to the individual’s internal traits, and the corresponding failure 
to recognize the influence of situational forces on that behavior is called “the 
fundamental attribution error”.
87  Against this readiness to put too much weight 
on individual differences, the work of scholars like Hanson has contributed to an 
understanding that human behavior relevant to the law heavily depends on these 
social  constraints.  Hanson  brought  this  perspective  into  the  Harvard  Law 
classrooms in 2008-09 with the course “Situationism”.
88 In an effort to have the 
students  actively  participating  in  scholarly  exploration  of  the  intersection 
between  law,  social  psychology,  social  cognition,  cognitive  neuroscience  and 
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85 See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical 
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87 See,  e.g.,  LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON  AND  THE SITUATION 4 
(1991) (“People’s inflated belief in the importance of personality traits and dispositions, together 
with their failure to recognize the importance of situational factors in affecting behavior, has 
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other mind sciences, Hanson would require them to write short papers, literature 
reviews, interviews, and article summaries – “some of which to be published on 
The Situationist Blog or other blogs or in non-law-review periodicals.”
89 This 
writing  workshop  format  has  been  adopted  by  Hanson  in  most  of  his  mind 
science courses – the “Law and Mind Sciences: Blogging Workshop”
90, offered 
in 2009-10, is an example of that. 
  Leaving  Hanson’s  contribution  aside,  and  going  back  to  a  more 
chronological approach, the curricular year of 2001-02 was a year of innovations 
in the Negotiation realm. Roger Fisher and Daniel Shapiro taught “Negotiation: 
Dealing with Emotions”, with the goal of helping future negotiators learn how to 
deal  with  their  emotions  during  the  negotiation  process.  In  addition,  Robert 
Bordone, Director of the Harvard Negotiation and Mediation Clinical Program, 
taught “Negotiation and Dispute Resolution – Interdisciplinary Research”, which 
involved  an  examination  of  different  perspectives  on  negotiation,  such  as 
behavioral decision theory, cognitive psychology, and social psychology.
91 
  In 2002-03, Dershowitz invites Stephen Kosslyn, John Lindsley Professor 
of Psychology in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, to co-teach a course titled 
“The Neuroscience of Law: Can a Legal System be Grounded in Knowledge 
about  the  Brain?”.  The  courses  revolved  precisely  around  that  question:  “can 
facts about the brain be used as foundations for a legal system?”
92 
  In 2003-04, two new courses emerged: “Laws of Deception”, by Bruce 
Hay;  and  “Law  and  Psychology:  The  Emotions”,  by  David  Cope,  that  has 
remained in the curriculum ever since. “Law and Psychology: The Emotions” 
 
offer[s]  students  a  chance  to  explore  what  is  missing  form  the 
traditional  law  school  rational  actor  model  of  human  behavior 
through discussion of readings primarily from psychology (but with 
contributions  from  biology,  philosophy,  an  literature)  about  the 
nature  and  operation  of  emotions  in  persuasion  and  negotiation, 
gender differences in emotional experience and expression, and the 
role of emotions in moral and legal decision making.
93  
 
In  “Laws  of  Deception”,  Bruce  Hay  conducted  a  discussion  of  the  problems 
arising  out  of  the  separation  between  truthful  and  false  statements  that  legal 
systems face.
94 
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  In 2005-06, Bruce Hay taught a course in “Law and Mind”, which would 
examine “some of the intersections between the law and human mental processes 
such  as  language,  perception,  cognition,  decision-making,  and  memory.”  The 
central themes of this course are central themes of the present paper’s normative 
part  too:  “(1)  how  research  on  the  mind  can  help  us  understand  or  resolve 
problems of law and policy, and (2) the legal system’s ambivalent reception of 
such research.”
95 
  In 2006-07, now Administrator of the White House Office of Information 
and  Regulatory  Affairs  Cass  Sunstein  taught  a  course  in  “Law  and  Human 
Behavior”  as  a  Visiting  Professor.  Co-author  of  the  book  Nudge:  Improving 
Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness,
96 that invites the reader to enter 
a world in which humans’ bounded rationality is a given, Sunstein brings this 
approach into the classroom. “Law and Human Behavior” covered topics like 
health law, social security reform, and antidiscrimination law, but always “with 
special reference to how real people really behave.”
97 The course was taught 
through the lens of behavioral law and economics and a similar version was 
offered in 2008-09 (now with Sunstein as a permanent professor at Harvard, 
after having left Chicago for personal reasons
98) under the name of “Behavioral 
Law and Economics.” 
  In the years 2007-08 and 2008-09, cognitive science was especially en 
vogue in the HLS curriculum. In 2007-08, Visiting Professor Henry Smith – now 
Fessenden Professor of Law at Harvard – led a reading group examining the 
relevance of recent findings in cognitive science for legal studies. In 2008-09, 
Visiting  Professor  Dan  Kahan  taught  “Law  and  Cognition”,  examining  how 
cultural worldviews
99 and other social and psychological affect the way legal 
decision-makers think. The seminar was offered again in 2011-12.  
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Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in “Acquaintance Rape” Cases, 158 U. 
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  Finally,  in  2009-10,  besides  the  ones  already  mentioned,  two  other 
“perfect” mind sciences courses were offered. Dan Simon, Professor of Law and 
Psychology  at  the  University  of  Southern  California  Gould  School  of  Law, 
taught “Law and Psychology: Wrongful Convictions”, which “examine[d] the 
operation  of  the  criminal  justice  system  through  the  lens  of  experimental 
psychology. The psychological research will be used to analyze why and how 
the criminal process results in mistaken verdicts, as it is occasionally prone to 
do.”
100 And in “Law and the Unconscious” Bruce Hay discussed the relevance 
that cognitive and psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious have to law.
101 
  I  characterized  the  years  2000  to  2010  as  a  golden  period  for  mind 
sciences mainly due to the profusion of “perfect” law and mind sciences courses; 
indeed, the trends were identified based on these courses only. It is worth noting, 
however, that this period was also a fertile one in terms of “imperfect” courses. 
Throughout these ten years, various were the courses that, despite not focusing 
mainly on the interconnection between law, policy, and mind, drew on insights 
from mind sciences: “Power, Beauty, Sex, and Violence”, with Diane Rosenfeld; 
“Regulation and Allocation of Risk”, with David Rosenberg and David Cope; 
“Sexual  Orientation  and  the  Law”,  with  William  B.  Rubenstein;  “Taboo 
Subjects”, with Alan Dershowitz; “Motivation”, with William Fisher and Yochai 
Benkler, among others. Moreover, the courses taught by Alan Stone – “Law, 
Psychology and Morality: An Exploration Through Film” and “Psychiatry and 
the Law” – were consistently offered during these ten years. 
  One main idea comes out of this rather exhaustive (my apologies for 
that!) overview of the law and mind sciences courses that populated the HLS 
curriculum  in  this  period:  a  new  wave  of  law  and  mind  science  thinkers  at 
Harvard  composed  by  Jon  Hanson,  Cass  Sunstein,  Bruce  Hay,  and  David 
Cope,
102 combined with the ever-present influence of Alan Stone and, although 
in a lesser degree in this decade, of Alan Dershowitz, generated a period of 
intense exploration of the implications of different mind sciences for the law in 
the HLS classrooms. 
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7. 2010-13: The Second Stabilization Period 
It is still early to understand if there is a new trend forming in terms of law and 
mind sciences in the HLS curriculum. One thing is certain, though: in 2010-11 
the number of “perfect” courses dropped to four – “Law and Mind Sciences”, 
“Law and Psychology: The Emotions”, “Law, Psychology, and Morality: An 
Exploration  Through  Film”,  and  “Psychiatry  and  the  Law”.  But  the  number 
seemed to remain more or less stable in 2011-12 and 2012-13, which leads me to 
ask if we are entering a second stabilization period. So far, the tendency seems 
to be for the mind sciences to be present in the HLS curriculum through the 
offering of three of four “perfect” courses per year, much like what happened 
during the 1969-1989 period. 
 
III. THE CASE FOR THE PROLIFERATION OF LAW AND MIND SCIENCES COURSES IN 
THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM 
 
1. Are Mind Sciences a Fundamental Part of the “Good Law Curriculum”? 
Before providing an answer (however tentative) to this question, reflection must 
be put into a previous one: is there such a thing as the good law curriculum? 
Eleanor M. Fox reframes this question. In The Good Law School, The Good 
Curriculum, and the Mind and the Heart,
103 she adopts the vantage point of the 
good law student: “What would the good law student, imbued with long-range 
interests and perfect information, demand?”
104 She acknowledges that different 
law schools have different personalities, and that it is ill-advised to recommend a 
standard law curriculum that does not give due regard to these differences.
105 
However, “an eclectic law school”, like HLS 
 
will provide several models: e.g., the student whose aspirations is 
to help people; the student who wants to be a big-firm (or a little-
firm)  lawyer;  the  student  who  wants  to  make  his  mark  in 
government service; the student who wants to be a law teacher; 
the student whose challenge is to learn the intellectual richness of 
the law.
106 
 
Admittedly, it is to a school like Harvard that the proposal made in the present 
section is addressed. By “a school like Harvard” I am not referring to a top-5 law 
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104 Id., at 484. 
105 See id., at 475. 
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school, but to a school that is comprehensively heterogeneous, a school that is 
diverse enough in its goals to train students to follow any of the above-stated 
career paths. In a law school like that – which, if you exclude the goal of teaching 
students to be law teachers, which seems to be reserved to a very small number 
of institutions, seems to be representative of the majority of U.S. law schools – 
should the mind sciences integrate the curriculum? 
  First, it must be acknowledged that law and some of the disciplines of the 
mind  have  a  lot  in  common.  This  similarity  is  particularly  evident  if  one 
compares  law  with  psychology.  Law  and  psychology  are  both  “exciting 
science[s] of people, not … boring science[s] of molecules”,
107 in that they are 
both concerned with the actions and thoughts of the individual. Law aims to 
control and regulate human behavior, which involves an implicit prior step: to 
predict and explain such behavior. That prior step of predicting and explaining 
human  behavior  (and,  to  a  certain  extent,  controlling  it)  is  the  focus  of 
psychology. An argument can thus be made that “[e]very branch of law, every 
legal regulation within each branch, every single person making or administering 
the law needs psychology[, that] [n]o law is ‘free of psychology’.”
108 The overlap 
between both disciplines is so intense that some authors go so far as saying that 
“law should be characterized as a component of psychology”
109 and that “law can 
be seen as an implicit … science of mind … [while] psychology is the explicit 
science.”
110 Bold opinions aside, because law is largely based on assumptions 
about  human  behavior,  the  conclusion  that  it  should  take  the  insights  of 
psychology  –  the  science  that  studies  that  behavior  –  into  account  seems 
inescapable, unless lawyers argue that human behavior is random and that as a 
consequence  any  studies  of  it  are  unhelpful,  which  sounds  like  a  rather 
implausible argument to make.
111 
  Adam Benforado, a former student of Hanson’s who later co-authored 
several articles with him, neatly summarizes why the “good law student” should 
want  to  have  contact  with  the  mind  sciences,  and  why,  consequently,  these 
disciplines should have a solid presence in the law curriculum: 
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[T]he mind sciences are important to incorporate into the law 
school  curriculum  for  several  reasons.   Most  notably,  I  think 
recent insights from psychology and neuroscience offer a much 
more accurate picture of how humans behave than the models 
provided  by  law  and  economics  and  other  legal  theoretical 
approaches.   This  is  vitally  important  because  current  law 
students are the ones who will have an opportunity to change 
laws in the future.  They need to understand how jurors make 
decisions,  how  eyewitness’s  memories  work,  and  why  people 
commit  crimes,  among  many  other  things,  in  order  to  decide 
whether  the  laws  on  the  books  are  likely  to  accomplish  their 
goals or whether they might instead breed unfairness.  In addition, 
and more generally, I think teaching mind sciences encourages 
students to be more critical consumers of conventional wisdom – 
which is incredibly useful as a lawyer.
112 
 
“At  the  very  least,”  Jon  Hanson  adds,  “they  will  learn  something  about 
themselves.”
113 
 
2. Who Should Decide? 
Given the benefits that law students would draw from being acquainted with the 
mind sciences, I now ask a different question: Who should decide whether the 
mind sciences should be included in the law curriculum or not? Two answers 
spring to mind: students and faculty should make the call. However, both these 
stakeholders in the future of the law curriculum are prone to making imperfect 
decisions. As Eleanor Fox observes, 
 
[t]here is no perfect person or role through whose eyes we should 
try to examine how well the law school world fulfills its role as 
educational provider. … [S]tudents lack information to appreciate 
what will prepare and enhance them as lawyers, and they have 
only  a  short-term  interest  in  law  school  ….  Faculty  have 
information  and  have  a  long-run  perspective  but  may  be 
influenced by personal preferences as to what, when, and how they 
wish to teach.
114 
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Not only shouldn’t the decision regarding the incorporation of the mind sciences 
in the law curriculum be taken by students or faculty, but it also won’t. I argue 
that the expansion or contraction of the presence of mind sciences in the law 
curriculum is not likely to be the product of a deliberate process. This presence 
will continue to be a function of the developments that take place outside the law 
school,  as  discussed  in  Part  II.2.  These  developments,  if  accepted  by  the 
gatekeepers of their respective domain as valuable contributions, will eventually 
reach  legal  scholars,  by  means  of  inter-domain  scholarly  communication.  As 
seen, this process is likely to take several years. Nonetheless, legal scholars will 
eventually implement developments occurring in the mind disciplines in legal 
scholarship. If this scholarship is, in turn, judged by the gatekeepers of the legal 
domain  –  the  editors  and  referees  of  major  legal  periodicals,  the  review 
committees of major funding agencies, and faculty of prestigious universities – 
as being of value, it will be accepted for publication and this, in turn, will have 
repercussions  in  the  faculty  recruitment.  Faculty  that  produce  this  kind  of 
scholarship, if hired, are likely to teach courses exploring the intersection of law 
and mind sciences. Evidence supporting this assumption can be found in the 
historical review conducted in Part II.  
As  it  has  been  discussed,  the  presence  of  mind  sciences  in  the  HLS 
curriculum is intimately dependent on the career and research interests of a very 
specific  group  of  professors.  If  the  “usual  suspects”  –  Alan  Stone  and  Alan 
Dershowitz,  joined  later  by  Jon  Hanson,  Bruce  Hay,  David  Cope,  and  Cass 
Sunstein – weren’t a part of Harvard Law’s faculty, the influence of the mind 
sciences would have been felt almost only at an “imperfect” level. Hence, a 
proliferation of the number of mind science courses in the law curriculum will 
occur under two conditions: i) if more professors with research interests related 
to the interconnection between law and mind sciences are hired; ii) and this will 
only happen if the study of law through the lens of the mind sciences proves to 
be a respected interdisciplinary approach to the law and, possibly, a reasonable 
alternative  to  law  and  economics  as  the  prevailing  framework  for 
interdisciplinary  analysis  of  law.  So  the  question  about  the  future  of  the 
influence of the mind sciences in the law school curriculum and the question 
about the impact of law and mind as an interdisciplinary approach to the law are, 
in reality, one question only. 
  I further claim that law and mind is already succeeding in proving its 
value to the legal community. The growing influence of law and mind in legal 
academia is happening in a direct and indirect way.  
In a direct way, psycho-legal research is both gaining more adepts and 
expanding to new areas. There is an increasing awareness that judges and other MIND SCIENCES IN THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM  29 
decision-makers are subject to cognitive biases;
115 that neuropsychology has a 
word to say in certain legal topics;
116 “and, more generally, [of] the power of 
emotions and other internal situational influences in how we formulate, interpret, 
and respond to laws.”
117 
118 The number of scholars trained in both disciplines is 
increasing, as is the range of legal areas that are studied through a psychological 
lens.  Moreover,  the  development  of  new  approaches  in  psychology,  like 
cognitive neuroscience,
119 and in the intersection of law and psychology, like 
therapeutic  jurisprudence,
120 provides  new  opportunities  for  psychological 
research to permeate the legal realm.  
In  an  indirect  manner,  psychology  is  already  taking  advantage  of  the 
dominance of economics in legal scholarship. First, law and economics had the 
effect  of  showing  the  value  of  interdisciplinary  approaches  to  law  to  legal 
theorists  and  lawmakers.  By  “open[ing]  their  eyes  and  turn[ing]  them  from 
darkness to light”,
121 law and economics broke the ground that would later be 
explored  by  other  interdisciplinary  approaches,  among  which  law  and 
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psychology.
122 In addition, as mentioned previously, decision-making scholars 
started to doubt some of the assumptions of the rational actor model and began 
to  test  these  assumptions  using  psychological  concepts  and  methods.  This 
eventually  led  to  the  birth  of  behavioral  economics  and,  consequently,  of 
behavioral law and economics. In this sense, “the broader law and mind sciences 
movement can be viewed as a reaction to the dominance of law and economics 
in the legal academy over the last several decades.”
123 
 
3. How Should We Go About It? 
Having concluded that exposure to social psychology, cognition, neuroscience 
and other mind sciences is beneficial for students and should thus be achieved 
through an inclusion of these insights in the law curriculum, a question still 
remains to be answered. How should we go about the inclusion of these insights 
into the law school classroom? How should professors who devote their research 
time  to  investigating  the  interactions  between  law  and  mind  sciences 
communicate the conclusions that arise out of their research to their students? 
There  are  two  ways  of  doing  this:  i)  by  teaching  basic  legal  courses 
incorporating  insights  from  the  mind  sciences  –  something  that  at  least  Dan 
Kahan, when at HLS, and Jon Hanson have been doing respectively in “Criminal 
Law”  and  “Torts”;  or  ii)  by  teaching  what  I  coined  “perfect  law  and  mind 
sciences courses”. 
  Again, I will resort to the clear-sightedness of Benforado to answer this 
question: 
 
In the long term, I think that we must strive to deliver both types 
of courses in the law curriculum.  Both offer great benefits.  In 
the  short  term,  I  think  that  dedicated  law  and  mind  sciences 
courses  are  probably  most  viable.   I  find  that  teaching  classic 
legal courses through the lens of the mind sciences takes a lot 
more work on the part of the professor.  I bring in a considerable 
amount  of  psychology  and  neuroscience  into  my  Business 
Organizations course, but it has taken a lot of time to think about 
how to do this and to actually execute it.  There isn’t a casebook 
out there that serves it up in a prepackaged format and, as a result, 
I don’t see many professors who are not already experts in the 
field making the effort to adapt their courses.  I also think that in 
a  classic  legal  course  (as  opposed  to  a  specialized  seminar), 
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students have stronger expectations about how the course should 
be taught and may be more resistant to the novel perspective.
124 
 
Regarding the teaching of standard legal courses through the mirror of the mind 
sciences, a point must be added, despite its apparent obviousness. It is unwise to 
require  professors  teaching  standard  legal  courses  to  incorporate  the  work  of 
mind scientists if they do not have the knowledge necessary to effectively adopt 
such an approach of if they simply do not feel comfortable doing it. This paper 
should not be read as advocating the tyranny of the mind sciences. Although it 
highlights the benefits that such an approach would have for law students, it 
should not be understood as proposing its across-the-board implementation in the 
law curriculum. First, because such approach might just not be appropriate for 
certain  areas  of  the  law.  Second,  because  the  teaching  style  is  something 
intimately  connected  not  only  to  a  law  professor’s  research  interests  (some 
professors might simply not be interested in what mind scientists have to say), 
but also to his or her personality. If Jon Hanson and Dan Kahan give wings to 
their students’ minds by employing this approach, it is certainly due to the fact 
that they are passionate about this way of teaching the law and deeply believe in 
its benefits; a professor forced to employ this approach – or, for that matter, any 
other approach that is not his or her own – would clip the wings of their students’ 
minds, rather than making them fully flighted. 
 
CONCLUSION 
“As of today, the mind sciences are, well, hot.” 
– Jon Hanson
125 
 
Indeed, the mind sciences seem to be invading the pages of legal scholarship. 
More  and  more  legal  academics  seem  to  be  making  efforts  to  become 
familiarized with the work of mind scientists and to integrate this work in their 
writings.
126 The question is whether the law school curriculum will follow this 
trend  and  react  to  the  increase  in  popularity  of  law  and  mind  as  an 
interdisciplinary  approach  with  a  corresponding  increase  in  course  offerings 
exploring this intersection. I have argued that law students would benefit from 
having contact with insights from the mind disciplines, both through basic legal 
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courses taught through the lens of those disciplines and through “law and”-type 
courses. The conclusion reached by the paper is that, given the rising popularity 
of this approach in legal scholarship, an increase in the law and mind curricular 
offerings  is  likely  to  occur  as  a  result  of  a  natural  process.  Because  faculty 
recruitment depends on scholarly publication, if the law and mind approach is 
appraised  by  the  academic  community,  scholars  using  this  approach  in  their 
writings are likely to get their work published, thus boosting their chances of 
getting hired. Once hired, these scholars are likely to teach courses specifically 
exploring  this  interconnection  (“law  and”  courses)  or  to  teach  basic  courses 
imbued with insights from the mind sciences. In Harvard, however, after a fertile 
decade in the law and mind sciences ground, we seem to be entering a period of 
stabilization with three or four “perfect” courses offered per year. Hopefully, this 
paper  will  serve  the  function  of  strengthening  the  law  and  mind  sciences 
movement  at  Harvard,  by  contributing  to  a  better  understanding  of  the 
importance of an expanded presence of the mind sciences in the curriculum. 
Students, lawyers, and the market of legal services in general would all benefit 
from this expanded presence. 